INTRODUCTION
Like many other fields of government activity, the last five years have seen those involved in the regulation of health and safety in the United Kingdom having to contend with the challenges posed by a sustained economic recession and a crisis of the public finances. 1 The institutional change heralded by the election of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 3 encompassing body of meaning and common-sense reality, around the issue. 4 On this reading, the conditions of a dominant (self-)regulatory paradigm have come to be accepted as part of the background against which policymaking occurs, internalising a set of fundamental assumptions that narrow the range of possibilities that regulation can pursue. This paper sets out the different stages through which this process of social construction has occurred. It shows how, via experimentation, interaction, institutionalization, and internalization, a particular vision of regulation has been advanced. This has been achieved via the adoption of principles of deliberative regulation as a means of bringing external considerations into the policymaking process and populating the regulatory landscape with language and ideas (such as regulatory myths) 5 that reframe core debates to reflect what are assumed to be widely-held 'common-sense' views of regulation. While the notion of basing legitimate policymaking on deliberative input from external stakeholders is widely-accepted as a principle of 'good government', it is also vulnerable to distortion when consultation is undertaken without safeguarding the validity of the input gathered. This paper shows that this linking of regulatory policy, government ideology, and 'public preference', has resulted in the entrenchment, rather than the offsetting, of a particular, detrimental, agenda for the future of health and safety regulation.
THE REGULATORY CONTEXT: A CHANGING PARADIGM?
A wealth of policy changes, reviews, and reforms have taken place within the field of health and safety regulation since 2010, and most of these developments have been characterised by a common preoccupation with a particular conception of 'social concern' about health and safety regulation. These developments have taken place against the backdrop of more than raising expectations and increasing the profile of the issue. And while Robens envisaged that the targeting of resources would be important, this reflected a desire to spread the benefits of regulation as far as possible, and to greatest effect, rather than an ingrained rejection of the notion of regulation. 18 Before more recent iterations of the risk-based regulatory paradigm recast interventionism and enforcement as signs of inefficiency and unreasonableness, they were widely regarded as reflecting the virtues of proactivity and the capacity of regulators to manage relations with duty-holders. 19 It must be acknowledged that health and safety regulation has never been applied with the fullness and degree of proactivity that the Robens ideal might suggest, and that there has been much continuity in the way that it has been addressed by successive governments over the last forty years. 20 And yet it is possible to detect a degree of 'newness' in the approaches of politicians, policymakers, and the media to health and safety in recent years: more critical, and more often on a normative, not just empirical level; more focused on the relationship between the regulatory framework and the wider social world; and more open to airing these criticisms in public. 21 As Hampton and Macrory demonstrated, there has also been a renewed emphasis on the toleration of risk as a principle of good government; whereas in the past, the creation of areas of deregulated risk was a side-effect of an ideological commitment to a smaller state apparatus, it is now viewed as valuable in itself to allow those areas of risk to exist, and to be managed by individual agents rather than curtailed outright. 22 Risk-taking is lauded (with, as in the case of the 2008 financial crash, sometimes disastrous consequences) 7 and the notion of the private sphere as somewhere that government (and hence regulators)
should not tread. The outcome of this shift has been the reconceptualisation of regulation as "a second-best choice for social organization" and "an always regrettable means of correcting market failure", 23 something that is considered illegitimate and undesirable by the public and policymakers alike. This notion of regulation as logically bounded and undesirable in certain fields of human endeavour is culturally as well as formally recognised, and is now the prevailing social narrative around health and safety regulation. 24 It has also formed a key component of policy rhetoric around the retrenchment of the regulatory framework, both via the Hampton/Macrory agenda, and via subsequent government initiatives since 2010.
FRAMING A SYMBOLIC UNIVERSE OF 'COMMON SENSE'
How has this new vision of regulation come to exert the influence over policy that it now wields, and why is the notion of regulation as illegitimate in relation to certain areas of risk and activity so ubiquitous? One way of understanding this process is as an example of 'consensus mobilization', or 'framing', as a form of social meaning creation. 25 Framing involves the generation of an interpretive schema to define a problem by "select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient". 26 In this way, a social reality is constructed which works to shape subsequent interpretation of that particular issue. While the majority of work around framing has looked at these processes within either social movements or media agendas, the study of wider cultural processes (such as the emergence of a new understanding of health and safety) leads onto discussion of more expansive notions 8 of social constructionism. This term connotes a view of social reality as the manufactured outcome of social processes of subjective interpretation and objective sharing of meaning.
These shared meanings constitute a commonly-understood and experienced social reality which is taken-for-granted by the participants in it. 27 The construction of these cultural meanings is an ongoing, dynamic process involving conversation, debate, and testing, in order to ensure that they convincingly explain experienced reality.
A crucial role in the development of a socially constructed reality is played by widely- have explicitly used the idea of common sense as a restrictive and critical limit on regulation;
policymakers have endeavoured to engage with representations of public common sense, and use the interaction stages of the meaning-generation process to form and consolidate one particular world-view. As such, it is necessary to consider the relationship between regulatory policymaking and public deliberation and opinion-formation in more detail.
THE NOTION OF DELIBERATIVE REGULATION
The concept of deliberative regulation draws on democratic social theory (including the work of Jürgen Habermas) 37 to posit a model of regulation as a forum within which institutional outcomes are grounded in participatory public discourses. 38 By establishing mechanisms to allow for the participation of a range of social actors in the regulatory process, this model seeks to ensure that the outcomes of decision-making are both more responsible, in the sense of taking account of a wider range of interests, and more responsive, in that they reflect public concerns more directly. 39 In a world where regulatory agencies are increasingly fragmented in structure and function, and faced with regulating an increasingly complex and contested set of risk issues, they are unable to retain a monopoly on 'rightness', and so must seek input from others in order to transcend their own particularism. 40 On the one hand, this reflects a shift towards responsive law that is instrumental, altering behaviour in pursuit of democratically-expressed public interest goals. 41 Deliberative engagement provides a responsive means of determining the goals to be pursued via a dispassionate bureaucratic process. 42 At the same time, it justifies the decisions taken, democratising them and ensuring 
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The crucial issue which arises in relation to the notion of deliberative regulatory engagement is one of depth and quality; it is not necessarily the case that any form of public consultation will render a policymaking process 'deliberative'. 51 As discussed previously, the concept of deliberative regulation is premised upon 'thick' forms of engagement which are participatory, legitimised as a form of action taken in the 'public interest', and are embedded within their social contexts and protected from domination by economic and bureaucratic power. 53 In order to be regarded as truly deliberative, public debate must be rational and truthful, open and inclusive, and ongoing or revisable in nature. 54 Only under these conditions can processes be said to be sufficiently non-hierarchical, fair, and mutual to allow all participants to transcend their particular standpoint and ensure that attitudes are moderated towards consensus. 55 For these reasons, deliberative engagement has the capacity to perform a fundamentally important role within the 'interaction' stage of Berger and Luckmann's model, turning subjective perceptions into a shared objective reality. In particular, the emphasis on the mutual adjustment of perceptions at this stage is consistent with the pursuit of intersubjective understanding that deliberative regulatory engagement typically involves.
In practice, the conditions for 'thick' deliberation are structurally and institutionally difficult to achieve because participatory forums that allow for this kind of engagement are so resource-intensive. This approach also assumes a degree of epistemological proximity between parties which may not exist; the views expressed may be too polarised to allow for common understandings to emerge. 56 Crucially, there is also an assumption that deliberative processes are open to all, whereas in reality different groups are able to access these forums to different degrees, depending on the levels of social and cultural power they possess. 14 means that requirements which are intended to protect the quality of participation systematically disadvantage those interests which are less able to organise professional representation. Partly as a result of these problems, many attempts to implement mechanisms of deliberative engagement reflect what may be described as 'thin' rather than 'thick'
versions of this approach. 58 Whereas thick conceptions reflect the mutual features of deliberative discourse, thin versions retain a commitment to the hierarchical development of regulatory goals which are then subjected to democratic approval. The policy-making process is pluralistic, with different interest groups having input via (for example) the submission of evidence or participation in a discussion forum. This ensures that outcomes reflect the aggregation of preferences, but not necessarily formal participation in policy-creation.
Instead, the emphasis is on good-quality, rather than substantively fair, regulation, subjecting bureaucratic decision-making to public scrutiny.
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This is the kind of stakeholder engagement solicited by the UK government, where the emphasis has been placed upon plurality rather than consensus; the goal is the representation of competing interests and there is no undertaking to actually use the information gathered.
This model reflects a restricted liberal view of the state's role as an arbiter of conflicts between individual interests, 60 something which is both empirically questionable 61 and also open to distortion, as decision-making processes centred on bargaining may be dominated by vested interests, whose capacity to organise their representative resources is greatest, leading to partisanship, instrumentalism, and regulatory capture. 62 Thin deliberative processes tend to be narrowly-drawn, meaning that they reflect a predetermined range of outcomes and so 58 Black (2000) empower those who set the agenda. 63 They are also not truly deliberative, since the preferences of actors exist a priori and are not mediated by deliberative participation, remaining the same at the end of the process as they were at that start. 64 Political risk management is thus dominated by an agenda that tends towards the superficial, and which involves only one, limited, version of public attitudes.
Together, these objections illustrate that 'thin' deliberation centres on the gathering of preferences as input into policy processes, rather than the generation of outputs that reflect deeper citizen engagement. This focus on input rather than output is central to the approach to public consultation taken by the UK government in recent years, perhaps reflecting the British regulatory state's deep-seated institutional inclination towards top-down, centralised bureaucratic policy-making, which efforts at 'modernization from above' have not dimmed. 65 Government practice has been driven by concern over the unresponsiveness of regulatory systems to the external social needs they should fulfil, and while 'thin' deliberative processes construct the appearance of responsiveness, using them to tackle this problem exposes their fragility. These fragilities are especially pronounced in policy areas which are contested by populist social agendas, and indeed, thinly deliberative processes may be utilised precisely in order to allow these agendas to permeate the policymaking process. 66 When political actors identify latent movements that are sympathetic to their ideological preferences, but which lack the formalised rigour required by mechanisms of evidence-based policy engagement, 67 public engagement may be employed as a means of imbuing notionally objective processes with this particular political agenda. Expert evidence is thus weighed against a conception of 'public concern' which is objectivised as an alternative form of 'evidence' via deliberative engagement. This process has been reflected in the UK's ongoing health and safety reforms since 2010, where thin deliberation has been used to embed an ideological, populist view of health and safety at work regulation within a policymaking process that can be mapped across the four stages (experimentation, interaction, institutionalization, internalization) of Berger and Luckmann's model of social reality construction.
EXPERIMENTATION: NEW GOVERNMENT, NEW RHETORIC
The reshaping of regulatory capacity prior to 2010 was driven by the strategic framing of regulatory compliance in rationalistic terms, something which was arguably constructed mutually by business duty-holders and governmental actors, 68 and which provided a basis for the subsequent development of a wider account of regulation and its social role. This account has underpinned the extension of those beliefs beyond issues of intervention and into other areas of regulatory policy, including the boundaries of the regulatory framework itself. 69 A powerful public narrative of 'health and safety gone mad', a resistance to regulation fuelled by hostile media coverage which documents examples of regulatory unreasonableness, heavy-handedness, and excess, has risen to prominence during the last fifteen years or so. stories coalesce around a set of well-established core themes, such as a challenge to some form of traditional activity and the use of humour to critique regulators, but they also retain a degree of non-specificity which renders them hard to definitively disprove. Like other compelling story forms, 71 this mixture has ensured their prominence within public discourse.
But as well as being popular, regulatory myth stories are also political phenomena, in that they challenge the legitimacy of regulators and are indicative of a principled objection to the bureaucratic over-reaching of the state and the risk-aversion of modern society. 72 Their core messages about the unreasonableness of state-imposed external constraints on the freedoms of private economic actors to determine the appropriate balance of risk and reward also reflect the fundamental principles of a neo-liberal approach to regulation. 73 Regulatory myths form part of a political dialogue about the undesirability of regulatory burdens and, despite the efforts of HSE to publicly rebut these stories, 74 by the mid-2000s, it was clear that they were increasingly being drawn upon to support influential currents within political thought and ideology. 75 From the outset, then, the ambition to reform and restrict the scope of the existing health and safety laws was present within the Government's policy agenda. But this particular, individual commitment was only meaningful for those who were similarly committed to a small-state political agenda; a degree of experimentation was required in order to render it both coherent and accessible to a wider audience. As such, the linkage of this commitment to the wider cultural tropes contained within regulatory myth stories constituted an experimental attempt to develop a new understanding of the reality of regulation, one which links wider processes of individual sense-making about visible phenomena (myth stories) to an overarching explanatory framework of ideas (about deregulation). This 'bottom-up' approach to the creation of meaning via practical experience and first-hand exposure is a common feature of many contexts within which understandings of health and safety are generated, particularly given the relatively low levels of latent knowledge about broader health and 82 The terms of reference and scope of the report were both clearly influenced by the experimental sense-making agenda around health and safety that had previously been constructed, as well as a similar narrative about a 'compensation culture'. 83 The Review was happy to accept from the outset that health and safety law had suffered a collapse of public legitimacy as a result of its over-reaching tendencies, 84 and that the scope of health and safety regulation must necessarily be bounded 20 by the need to avoid compromising the economic interests of business. 85 The excessive costs of health and safety compliance were evidenced by reference to regulatory myths, making the interplay between perception and practice central to the subsequent Review.
Young made a series of recommendations relating to the 'compensation culture', centred on the streamlining of the civil litigation system and the regulation of claims management companies. 86 In relation to health and safety, he recommended reducing the requirements incumbent upon low-hazard workplaces and simplifying the legislative framework in order to return to the principles of proportionality underpinning the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 87 In doing so, Young voiced principles which were well-established within regulatory circles, 88 but the detail of these proposals was not concrete; what is regarded as a 'low-risk'
workplace is unclear, as are the meanings of 'simplification' and 'exemption'. The report also recommended the removal of restrictions upon good Samaritans, adventure sports, school trips, and children's play areas, 89 and the creation of an Ombudsman to allow individuals to challenge unreasonable safety decisions. Perhaps the most striking feature of the Young Review was the extent to which it explicitly linked these concrete issues of policymaking to the experimental sense-making account of health and safety outlined in the previous section, conflating perceptions and substantive realities as a result; it concluded that the compensation culture was an issue of "perception rather than reality", 90 but proposed substantive reforms to the law in order to tackle this perceived problem. And in relation to health and safety law, 21 it recognised that many of the stories that underpin that sense-making account of regulation are misperceptions, driven by a media agenda, 91 but also accepted the content of those misperceptions as a basis for decision-making.
The Review undertook interaction with a wider public constituency via two mechanisms: a consultation process which gathered responses from stakeholders, and an engagement with mediated popular opinion via the regulatory myths that were cited, neither of which made any claims as to deliberative breadth. The former involved a relatively low-key engagement with businesses, interest groups, representative organisations, trades unions, and self-selecting individuals who responded to an invitation to comment; this was translated by Young into a self-contained series of observations, mostly about the problem of negative media coverage, but a few of which identified a lack of regulatory clarity and the problems of over-burdening businesses. 92 The latter was a means of engaging with public concern by proxy, treating adverse media commentary as both a problematic phenomenon, and as an indicator of a popular mandate for change. Reform was thus required because "many are the reports of activities and events banned...in the name of health and safety", 93 which highlighted a system gone wrong. Crucially, this step allowed for the development of an emergent, shared understanding around this issue, recasting otherwise technical, obscure issues of regulatory policy via the medium of easily-accessible, public narratives of 'health and safety gone mad', using the pessimistic outlook of the latter to evidence a need to change the former, and thus binding government ideology and public perception into something approaching a whole.
It must be recognised that the Young Review was a political undertaking. It was conducted by a former Conservative Government Minister who had overseen a previous era of 91 id., 25. 92 id., 46-8. 93 id., 26. 22 deregulatory initiative during the 1980s, 94 and was commissioned early during the Coalition Government, seemingly so that the Conservative faction within it could show an ongoing commitment to politically symbolic elements of its election manifesto. As such, it was always likely to be heavily concerned with issues of public perception. Nevertheless, Young's engagement with external input was highly selective and the Report gave more prominence to anecdotal evidence than it did to the evidence provided by the consultation respondents. In a sense, this highlights one of the key problems associated with thinly deliberative processes; the opportunity for input provided is not counterbalanced by a clear commitment to testing the validity of that input through processes of sustained citizen engagement. 95 By privileging the insights that regulatory myths are claimed to provide (at the same time as decrying their ubiquity), the Young Review both validated them and used them to legitimate its own ideological preferences. The openness of the review process was sufficient to allow for consideration of evidence which was of limited factual veracity and inherently deregulatory in nature, suggesting that the process was designed with just such an outcome in mind. 23 with the emergent Governmental understanding of health and safety regulation as costly, ineffective, and obstructive. This process was significant because of its deliberative component; it sought to harness the power of the internet to elicit the opinions of the public sphere, 99 and to channel this information into the decision-making process as a representation of democratic preference. This was a public forum, and did not seek to engage with expert opinion or specified stakeholders. As such, it fitted the model of 'thin' and pluralistic public consultation outlined previously. Health and safety was one of the six core themes singled out for attention and attracted 1320 responses, a significant proportion of which were very hostile, citing the economic costs of regulation and the lack of self-reliance that it instilled in individuals. 100 Many respondents cited examples that were drawn from 'regulatory myth' stories or narratives of tort law excess, which the Red Tape Challenge then reproduced for subsequent consumption by formal government bodies.
The Red Tape Challenge illustrates clearly the 'mutual adjustment of perceptions' that constitutes the second, interaction stage of Berger and Luckmann's model. The input gathered via 'thin' deliberative engagement was limited to surface-level expression of opinion rather than outcomes of any open and ongoing processes of deliberative engagement, 101 and so did not test the truthfulness of these beliefs, 102 but rather allowed for them to be shared and reinforced. The rhetorical framing of the process as a 'Red Tape
Challenge' pre-empted its findings and positively invited comments questioning the legitimacy of regulation, and this 'agenda-setting' 103 shaped participants' understandings in accordance with the established ideological narrative that the Government was seeking to 24 develop. 104 The conjunction of regulatory myths and a dislike of 'red tape' with a more principled neo-liberal objection to intervention in the private sphere of the workplace was central to this process of consultation, and while particular stories of excess were only occasionally linked to subsequent reform proposals, 105 their wider impact was to reframe the agenda in terms of a public resistance to health and safety regulation grounded in 'commonsense' ideas that should properly be regarded as natural and beyond debate. 106 And once these understandings were embedded in a 'comprehensive' survey of public attitudes, and communicated in an authoritative policy document, they became increasingly 'objectivised'
as concrete social facts. 107 Subsequent outcomes would be judged against the supposedly universal, common-sense principles of individualised (rather than mandated) decisionmaking, rationalized (rather than universal) intervention, and business-oriented (rather than welfarist) regulation that this thinly-deliberative process was designed to find support for. proportionate, and targeted at the problematic minority of duty-holders; and the need for business competitiveness demands that regulations be minimalist 113 and economicallyrational. 114 Arguably, Löfstedt's own appointment was an act of framing; as a respected researcher who had previously advocated risk-based approaches, but whose background was sufficiently distant from local debates about health and safety regulation, his likely focus on due process would not involve reopening the partisan debates that Young and the Red Tape
INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE LÖFSTEDT REVIEW
Challenge had already settled. In a sense, authorial neutrality was a means of ensuring that decisions would be made within the terms of the emergent social reality. and tripartite advisory panel to assist in the formation of his report. This provided an opportunity for input from a wide range of bodies, many of whom would have been highly critical of the direction of government policy. And while Löfstedt was able to consider the submissions made via the Red Tape Challenge, these were not drawn on explicitly within the report that was produced. All of this, when combined with Löfstedt's commitment to evidence-led policymaking and independence from political interference, meant that, while
the Review was open to criticism due to its relatively narrow evidence-base, 119 it remained a broadly constructive document which emphasises continuity and improvement rather than wholesale change. But there were three key areas where the Review's findings seemed to directly reflect the framing of regulation as a common-sense matter of individualised, rationalized, and minimalist intervention. The focus placed onto these issues within Firstly, a change was proposed in relation to strict liability, so that existing duties which make employers liable for injury caused by their acts or omissions regardless of fault should be amended by adding a reasonable practicability defence or by precluding liability. The 'problem' of strict liability in the health and safety context has long been overstated, 120 and there are few cases where such defences do not already apply, meaning that just three examples could be referenced within the review. 121 Yet the importance attached to the idea of employees using strict liability to bring frivolous claims against employers suggests that it symbolises a broader concern about paternalist interventionism infringing upon commonsense principles of individual responsibility. The Government's response to this proposal, the 
INTERNALIZATION: THE POST-LÖFSTEDT WORLD
The Löfstedt report was formally accepted after publication and the majority of the recommendations were promptly implemented. 131 While it aimed to take a dispassionate, evidence-led approach to reform, it still provided a means by which a set of policy choices relating to a deregulatory shift could be brought into the policymaking process. The deliberative and evidence-based modes of inquiry that it adopted were not sufficient to break out of the broader framing of health and safety law that had preceded it. 133 While some of this difference of emphasis is due to subsequent political capital being made from the reform process, it also results from the validation of deregulation as a goal to be pursued by government and against which the value of a policy can be measured.
Two subsequent initiatives illustrate the embedding of this common-sense approach to regulation within the regulatory imagination, not only of policymakers and government, but also of the wider public. A 'Mythbusters Challenge Panel' was created to scrutinise disproportionate health and safety decisions referred to it by the public, and this body has ruled on 336 cases, mostly regulatory myth-based (as of December 2014). 134 The invocation of citizen input here provides a means of reinforcing and internalizing the core assumption that individualized, rationalized, business-oriented decision-making is the expectation against which regulators should be measured. Citizens should seek out and report cases that do not 31 conform to the new orthodoxy of health and safety regulation, and the collation of these reports in a visible, high-profile form serves to verify that this understanding is right by recreating them as examples to discuss and reflect upon, thus forming part of the "routine maintenance of everyday life". 135 The notion of a common-sense approach to regulation is expressed again in the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill, recently passed into law by Parliament, 136 which requires a court to take into account the fact that a person who may have breached a statutory or common-law duty was acting heroically or for the benefit of society when adjudicating on their potential liability. The Bill appears to be a symbolic reaction to some of the regulatory myths discussed (and, indeed, refuted) by the Young and Löfstedt reviews 137 rather than a substantively meaningful change to the law; it is best understood as an engagement with the 'realities' of the common-sense conception of health and safety regulation as a matter of undue interference with individual freedoms.
One key feature of this new social reality of health and safety regulation has been that political rhetoric around the issue has become arguably more belligerent than at any time in recent memory, with the Government "determined to stamp out the health and safety killjoys… [and] 141 Health and safety is thus reframed as a matter of selfinterested exchange, rather than a universal, welfarist social goal, and thus as a cost to be divided up and allocated between parties.
Similarly, the promulgation of a seemingly UK-influenced deregulatory agenda at European level by the High-Level (Stoiber) Group on Administrative Burdens, which recommended the adoption of key principles of regulatory minimalism, non-universality (exemption), and economic rationality to tackle excessive red tape, 142 exists within the same policy frame of reference. This reflects one of Löfstedt's key recommendations, namely, that British policymakers and politicians should engage more fully with European Union-level processes and institutions to ensure that new legislation is evidence-led and risk-based. 143 But the Stoiber Group is a consultative, stakeholder-led institution which was created in order to reduce burdens on business, and has long acted as a repository for deregulatory impulses and advocacy at the European level. This mode of engagement with the UK's European partners is best understood as an effort to widen the scope of the symbolic regulatory universe constructed in the UK and embed the processes of experimentation and interaction, and thus the establishment of a dominant deregulatory agenda, at a European level. For the most part, then, rather than the measured discussions about risk that Löfstedt advocated, the reform process has created a new adversarialism around the politics of regulation, and driven the internalization of a dominant narrative of health and safety regulation which then constrains the range of possibilities that subsequent policymaking can consider. The new orthodoxy of health and safety policy is dictated by the notion of common-sense regulation as an individualised, rationalised, minimalist undertaking, and this is the frame within which all subsequent decision-making must take place.
CONCLUSION: MAKING SENSE OF THE REFORM PROCESS
The public sector reforms that have followed the post-2008 economic crisis have not simply been pragmatic cost-cutting measures; public sector budget-setting is also a regulatory tool, allowing governments to exert control over policy via the medium of money. 144 The rollingback of the health and safety system during this period has ideological underpinnings that predate these spending reviews and speak to more fundamental conceptions of the role of the state, something which subsequent initiatives claiming deliberative capacity and evidencebased rigour have embedded. Central to this conception is the notion of regulation as a form of 'red tape' which stands in opposition to common-sense notions of individualism and anti- 147 or political lobbying, 148 regulatory reform is shaped by the 'truth claims' used as framing devices by actors within the process, particularly those occupying positions of power. 149 In the case of health and safety regulation, unlike these other examples, the emphasis has been less upon the advancement of an explicitly pro-business agenda, and more upon the establishment of a new orthodoxy in the framing of issues of regulation in accordance with one particular set of values.
The notion of 'common-sense' regulation was developed through experimentation with particular forms of public and government truth-claim, and introduced into the policymaking process via thinly deliberative processes of public engagement and interaction, such as the 'beyond politics'. The result is a new symbolic universe of meaning, outside the scope of direct contemplation, which exerts great influence over the direction of thought and action.
It is particularly significant to recognise the role played by deliberative engagement within this process of social reality construction. By facilitating input into policy-making, deliberative processes are intended to ensure that the interests of those outside the formal sphere of political and economic influence are represented; by retaining a commitment to values of rationality, openness, and inclusiveness, the resultant outcomes should represent the best settlement of general social interests. 150 But we have seen that, in the context of health and safety policymaking at least, the use of 'thin' forms of deliberative engagement has allowed for processes of interaction and institutionalization to take place which have embedded a particular ideological approach to regulation, and which have given primacy to certain, established interests, ideas, and narratives. In part, this is because a lack of commitment to the core values of meaningful engagement set out above has allowed a social reality grounded in misperception to take hold, but it is also due to the permeability of these processes, which permit entrenched, powerful interests to shape the outcomes of the policy process. 151 At every stage, a neo-liberal, small-state agenda of individualised, businessoriented, narrowly-targeted regulation has exerted considerable influence over the direction of policy to an extent that more explicit input from those advocating deregulation would be unlikely to achieve. This is the final irony; that mechanisms which open the formal, top-down process of regulatory policymaking to a wider range of interests can be so effectively redirected by the bottom-up, informal influence of processes of social reality construction which bear the imprint of a much narrower and more particular political and social agenda.
